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Sport in the European Constitution: 
All sound and no fury?  
 
Stefaan Van den Bogaert & An Vermeersch *  
 
Abstract 
This contribution discusses the formal inclusion of sport in the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. It shall assess whether Articles I-17 and III-282 can be legitimately 
expected to provide the necessary impetus to create a coherent and deliberate European sports 
policy. In order to come to a balanced judgement in this respect, the past and present dealings 
with sports issues of the European institutions, predominantly the European Commission and 
the Court of Justice, shall be analysed. It will become clear that the introduction of sport as an 
official Union policy in the Constitutional Treaty would not entail drastic changes in the EU 
approach to sport, but could nevertheless generate a number of positive effects.   
 
Keywords 
Sport – EU – constitution – direct policy – indirect approach 
 
Introduction 
 Sport is a universal phenomenon with great social and economic relevance. The 
budget for the 2012 Olympics in London exceeds £2 billion. An increasing number of athletes 
play sports professionally. Millions of people watch their performances live at the stadium or 
on television. A fitting regulatory framework is required to steer sports practice in the right 
direction. Traditionally, this has been the prerogative of the sporting associations. Gradually, 
also local and national governments become involved in this. At European level, however, 
 4 
sport is nowhere mentioned in the EC Treaty. In view of its international character par 
excellence, this absence is remarkable. All the more so, because the European institutions are 
actively engaged in sporting affairs. Currently, mere two Declarations, emphasising the 
specific characteristics of sport and its social, educational and cultural significance, have been 
adopted during the Intergovernmental Conferences of Amsterdam
1
 and Nice
2
.  
On the occasion of the revision of the existing European Community Treaties, the 
European Convention did insert two provisions relating to sport in the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, hereby officially recognising sport for the first time as an area of 
Union policy.
3
 This Constitutional Treaty was scheduled to enter into force on 1 November 
2006. However, two referenda held in France and the Netherlands, two Founding Fathers of 
the European construct, resulted in a vigorous rejection of the Constitution. The outcome of 
these popular votes has plunged the EU into an unprecedented crisis. At the moment, it 
remains very much to be seen whether the 25 Member States will succeed in ratifying the 
Constitutional Treaty at all, and if they manage to do so, whether it will be in its current form, 
or rather in a more diluted version.
4
 The future of sport in the Treaty is thus already in doubt, 
before it even really has had a present, let alone a past. This ongoing ratification crisis 
provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate Articles I-17 and III-282 upon their strengths 
and weaknesses. These provisions are unmistakably intended to give an impetus to a more 
coherent and deliberate European sports policy. It shall be analysed whether they can 
realistically be expected to achieve this goal. In order to come to a balanced judgement in this 
respect, the already developed – direct and indirect – European sports approach shall be 
                                                          
* Lecturer in European Law, Maastricht University, and Academic Assistant, European Institute, Ghent University. 
The authors would like to thank Inge Govaere, Hildegard Schneider and Stephen Weatherill for their useful 
comments on an earlier version of this article. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1
 Declaration (N° 29) on Sport, annexed to the final act of the Treaty of Amsterdam [1997] OJ C340/136. 
2
 Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account should be 
taken in implementing common policies, annexed to the Conclusions of the Nice European Council, Bulletin EU, 12-
2000. 
3
 Articles I-17 and III-282 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004) OJ C 310. 
4
 Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States on the ratification of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, annexed to the Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (16-17 June 
2005), SN 117/05. 
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subjected to scrutiny.
5
 The repercussions of an eventual failure to ratify the Constitutional 
Treaty for Europe’s sports policy will also be considered.  
 
Sport in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
 
During the sessions of the European Convention, several options with regard to the future 
role of the EU in the field of sport passed the review.
6
 Firstly, one considered whether sport could 
be granted an exemption from the application of the Community rules, a solution which many 
sporting federations favoured.
7
 This would enable them to settle their affairs internally. And the 
European institutions would no longer be saddled with difficult, long and costly disputes relating 
to sport. However, it is highly uncertain whether such a solution would turn out to be an 
improvement for all clubs, athletes and federations concerned. Moreover, for such an exemption 
to be formalised in a Treaty amendment or a Protocol attached to the Treaty, the approval of all 
Member States is required to revise the Treaty in this respect.
8
 It seemed improbable that such a 
consensus could ever be found.
9
 Besides, the sporting world has failed to come up with 
convincing arguments which would justify taking such a drastic measure.
10
 For these reasons, this 
option was firmly discarded. Secondly, one also contemplated a status quo, implying that the 
Community institutions are simply to proceed with their activities in the domain of sport, without 
any formal changes being made to the Treaty. Arguably, this option would not cause the 
Community’s indirect approach to sport to undergo any radical changes, as the Treaty provisions 
on freedom of movement rules and competition law would continue constituting the regulatory 
framework against which the lawfulness of sporting rules and practices is scrutinised. It would 
                                                          
5
 On the distinction between indirect and direct sports approach, Tokarski, Steinbach, Petry and Jesse, Two Players – 
One goal? Sport in the European Union (Meyer & Meyer, Oxford, 2004), p. 61. These two aspects reflect the dual 
mechanism that traditionally guides the European integration process: negative versus positive integration. Parrish, 
‘The Politics of Sports Regulation in the European Union’ (2003) 10 Journal of European Public Policy, p. 250.  
6
 Parrish, Sports law and policy in the European Union (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 211-
216. 
7
 Foster, ‘Can Sport Be Regulated by Europe?: An Analysis of Alternative Models’, in Caiger & Gardiner (eds.), 
Professional Sport in the European Union: Regulation and Re-regulation (The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2000), p. 
43; Husting, ‘Quelle reconnaissance pour l’ “exception” ou pour la spécificité sportive dans la nouvelle constitution 
européenne?’ (2004) 481 Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 515. 
8
 Fernández Salas, ‘De la possibilité de renverser l’arrêt ‘Bosman’ par une modification du Traité. Perspectives 
juridiques’ (1996)  1 RMUE, p. 155. 
9
 Van Nuffel, ‘Case law: Bosman’ (1996) 2 Col JEL, p. 345. 
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also mean a continuing lack of direct EC competence in sports. This was regarded as being not 
entirely satisfactory either. Therefore, finally, one envisaged including an explicit reference to 
sport in the new Treaty. The French ministry for sport launched the initiative.
11
 After some 
modifications, especially during the Italian presidency,
12
 the following text was ultimately 
adopted by the IGC: 
 
Article I-17 
‘The Union shall have competence to carry out supporting, co-ordinating or complementary 
action. Such action shall, at European level be: … (d) Education, youth, sport and vocational 
training …’.  
 
Article III-282   
‘1. […] The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while 
taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its 
social and educational function. 
Union action shall be aimed at: 
[…] (g) developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness 
in sporting competitions and co-operation between bodies responsible for sports, and by 
protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially young 
sportsmen and sportswomen. 
2. The Union and the Member States shall foster co-operation with third countries and the 
competent international organisations in the field of education and sport, in particular the 
Council of Europe. 
3. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article: 
(a) European laws or framework laws shall establish incentive measures, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. They shall be adopted after 
consultation of the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee; 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
10
 Weatherill, ‘Do sporting associations make law or are they merely subject to it?’ (1999) 13 Journal of the Society 
for Advanced Legal Studies, p. 24. 
11
 CONV 478/03, ‘The place of sport in the future Treaty’, 10 January 2003. Also Commissioner Reding insisted on 
this: Agence Europe, N° 8400, 14 February 2003, 17. 
12
 CIG 52/03 ADD1, ‘IGC 2003, Naples Ministerial Conclave: Presidency proposal’, 25 November 2003; CIG 60/03 
ADD1, ‘Intergovernmental Conference ADDENDUM 1 to the Presidency proposal’, 9 December 2003. 
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(b) the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations.’ 
 
The potential importance of these Treaty provisions lies principally in the fact that they 
would help to create clarity on the so-called ‘legal environment of sport’.
 13
 This insertion of 
sport in the formal Treaty framework would turn it into an official Union policy. It has partially 
also a symbolic character, for it would ‘legitimise’ initiatives already taken in the domain of 
sport. For the first time, the EU would be granted an express, albeit limited, role to play in the 
field of sport. Moreover, these Articles would demarcate the level playing field of the EU in 
sport, stipulating that the Union can only engage in supporting, co-ordinating and complementary 
action. The competence in this context would thus rest primarily with the Member States and the 
sporting federations. The Union would only have a role of secondary importance to play. The 
sporting associations do not have to fear that their regulatory competences have been encroached 
upon. 
 
Practically, Article III-282 would provide the necessary legal and financial basis for the 
further development of a coherent direct sports policy. This provision focuses mainly on the 
social and educational aspects of sport. It comprises general and high-profile goals such as the 
development of the European dimension in sport, the promotion of fairness and openness in 
sporting competitions and co-operation between sports bodies, and the protection of the physical 
and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen. Simultaneously, the Union is given only a 
limited set of instruments ‘to contribute to the achievement of these objectives’, as European laws 
or framework laws can merely establish incentive measures. Besides these, the Council can adopt 
only recommendations. Furthermore, harmonisation of the Member States’ laws and regulations 
is explicitly prohibited. These restrictions illustrate that the role of the Union in the field of sport 
is to remain limited. In this respect, it is nevertheless submitted to reconsider this exclusion of 
any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. It seems possible to 
envisage areas of sport in which harmonisation at supranational level might actually be the 
solution to a particular problem. This does not automatically have to contradict with the limited 
competence of the Union in sporting affairs. In the fight against doping, for example, the Union 
                                                          
13
 According to a survey, 62% of the European citizens support the enshrining of sport in the Constitution. However, 
only one out of two respondents (51%) supports an increased intervention of the EU in sport; 34% do not support 
this idea. Special Eurobarometer, The citizens of the European Union and Sport, November 2004. 
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could arguably fulfil a useful complementary role by providing a legal framework for the uniform 
implementation (in all Member States) of arrangements agreed upon at international level, e.g. 
within the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). However, since harmonisation in this domain is 
ruled out by Article III-282 Constitution, and cannot be realised on the basis of the provisions on 
public health either,
14
 the Union’s intervention in this field will continue to be limited to the 
subsidising of research and initiatives to raise public awareness and educate young sporting 
people.
15
 At a meeting of the EU sports ministers at the end of 2004, it was decided to organise 
consultations at national and European level in order to define the future policy and to implement 
the new sports provisions.
16
 Supposedly, the follow-up of the European Year of Education 
through Sport could also offer some input for the future sports policy.
17
 One could think of 
extending measures that exist already, like promotional campaigns, exchange projects and other 
projects supporting European sporting activities, as core elements of the future policy.  
 
Strictly legally speaking, the new Treaty provisions on sport would have no immediate 
bearing on the Union’s indirect approach to sport. In this context, their importance seems to be of 
a mere symbolic nature. The recognition of sport as an official Union policy could very well 
constitute the decisive impetus for the Union institutions to firmly subject sporting activities in 
their economic dimensions to the Treaty’s trade law rules and to keep the privileged treatment 
linked with the special status of sport within appropriate proportions, balancing the special 
features of sport evenly with the exigencies of free movement and competition law. In this 
respect, it is worth pointing out that Article III-282(1) merely mentions that the Union shall take 
‘account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social 
and educational function’ while contributing to the promotion of European sporting issues. 
Contrary to what the federations may have wished for, this particular clause clearly is not going 
                                                          
14
 Article III-278(4) Constitutional Treaty leaves the possibility of harmonisation open only for a set of strictly 
defined purposes of common safety concerns in public health matters. However, the Community legislature cannot 
be prevented from relying on Article 95 EC: Case-376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council of the EU 
[2000] ECR I-8419, para. 88. 
15
 Speech by Commissioner Figel at the public hearing on ‘Drug-taking in Sport: Obstacle to the Ideal of 
Athleticism?’, European Parliament, Brussels, 29 November 2004. However, the 2004 Eurobarometer survey shows 
a great level of public expectation (80%) in relation to EU action in the fight against doping. Special Eurobarometer, 
above n. 14. 
16
 Presidency Conclusions, Informal EU sports ministers conference, The Hague, 1&2 December 2004.  
17
 Joint Declaration by the Troïka ministers for education and sport and the European Commission, 2 December 
2004; Speech by Commissioner Reding at the meeting with European sport federations, ‘Sport et Union européenne: 
ensemble pour relever de nouveaux challenges’, Brussels, 6 October 2004. 
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to bring about a change in the current application of Community law to sport. The Union would 
only be obliged to take into account the specific nature of sport when it undertakes direct action 
in sport on the basis of Article III-282. On this particular issue, it could even be argued that the 
Constitutional Treaty retreats one step compared to the Declaration on Sport adopted in Nice. In 
the latter, it was stipulated in a more general way that ‘[…] Even though not having any direct 
powers in this area, the Community must, in its action under the various Treaty provisions, take 
account of the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and making it special, 
[…].’
18
 However that may be, it is submitted that the decision of the European Convention and 
the subsequent IGC not to reassert this phrase is unobjectionable. In any event, it would not have 
provided a general exemption status for sport. Such a clause would only give rise to a lot of 
controversy and would risk being invoked and interpreted inappropriately.  
 
 
Direct Sports Policy 
 
Despite the absence of an express Treaty competence with regard to sport, the Community 
institutions have managed to develop some kind of direct sports policy over the years. The 
origins of this direct sports approach go back to the 1984 Fontainebleau European Council
19
 and 
the Adonnino Report on ‘A People’s Europe’.
20
 At that time, the Community’s policy 
concentrated on the potential of sport to achieve ‘European goals’. Sport was in the first place 
considered as a forum for communication among peoples, a tool to strengthen the image of the 
EU in the minds of its citizens.
21
 Concretely, the Community’s involvement in the field of sport 
remained for the most part limited to the funding of international sporting competitions like the 
European Sailing Regatta or the Tour de l’Avenir in cycling.
22
 After the adoption of the Single 
European Act in 1986, Community interest in the field of sport moved onto a broader social, 
educational and cultural plane and the first pleas for the development of a European sports policy 
                                                          
18
 Emphasis added. 
19
 Conclusions of the Fontainebleau European Council (25-26 June 1984), Bulletin European Communities, 6-1984.  
20
 Adonnino Report, ‘A People’s Europe’, Bulletin European Communities 6-1985, Suppl. 7/85. 
21
 Ibidem, 5.9; European Parliament, Resolution on sport in the Community, 13 April 1984, [1984] OJ C 127/142. 
22
 Tokarski, Steinbach, Petry and Jesse, above n. 5, pp. 62-63. 
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emerged.
23
 This growing interest in sport resulted in official recognition of sport at institutional 
level in the EU. Nowadays, the Directorate General on Education, Training & Youth of the 
European Commission comprises a separate sports unit. Since the early 1990’s, the Commission 
also organises an annual European Sports Forum, bringing together the sporting federations and 
representatives of the national and regional administrations, the so-called sports directors, to 
structure the dialogue with the sporting world.
24
 In the European Parliament, the Committee on 
Culture and Education deals with sports issues. Furthermore, the ministers of sport of the 
Member States regularly meet on an informal basis.  
 
Be that as it may, however, it has by no means proved to be a straightforward exercise to 
create a coherent and comprehensive direct sports policy. The lack of an express reference to 
sport in the EC Treaty has inevitably had repercussions. Firstly, the Community ‘actions’ relating 
to sport remained limited to the level of communications, resolutions, reports or declarations of 
intent, emphasising, in particular, the social and educational function of sport. As the Treaty 
contains no clear legal basis for action in the domain of sport, the Community institutions have to 
be careful not to overstep the limits of their competences. Besides, the sporting associations 
firmly hold on to their self-proclaimed regulatory autonomy and only reluctantly accept any 
interference into their affairs. After the decision of the Court of Justice in Bosman,
25
 Community 
action in the field of sport nonetheless intensified. The Commission elaborated, inter alia, the 
‘Helsinki report on sport’, in which the protection of young sportsmen and female athletes and 
the fight against doping were identified as the principal objectives, besides the fight against the 
excessive commercialisation and economic interpenetration of sport.
26
 At the Intergovernmental 
                                                          
23
 European Parliament, Resolution on sport in the European Community and a People’s Europe, 17 February 1989, 
[1989] OJ C 69/234. 
24
 In 2004 there was no European Sports Forum. However, the Commission organised a consultation conference with 
the European Sport movement on 14-15 June 2005. See ‘Sports movement wants EU to take account of sport in 
other policy areas’, 16 June 2005, http://www.euractiv.com. 
25
 Case C-415/93 URBSFA v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
26
 Communication from the Commission (COM (1999) 644 and /2), Report from the European Commission to the 
European Council with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport 
within the Community framework (‘The Helsinki report on Sport’). Consult http://europe.eu.int/comm/sport/. 
For detailed analysis, consult Weatherill, ‘The Helsinki Report on sport’ (2000) 25 ELRev 282. See also: Presidency 
Conclusions, Vienna European Council, (11 & 12 December 1998), Bulletin EU 12-1998; A-4-0197/97, ‘Report on 
the role of the European Union in the field of sport’, Rapporteur: Pack, 28 May 1997; European Parliament, 
Resolution on the role of the European Union in the field of sport, 13 June 1997, [1997] OJ C 200/252; A3-
0326/94/PART A, ‘Report on the European Community and Sport’, Rapporteur: Larive, 27 April 1994; European 
Parliament, Resolution on the European Community and sport, 6 May 1994, [1994] OJ C 205/486. 
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Conferences in Amsterdam and Nice, the Heads of State and Government adopted the two 
aforementioned Declarations relating to sport.
27
 These Declarations unmistakably have 
considerable political relevance, the Amsterdam Declaration being referred to by the 
Luxembourg courts in their rulings.
28
 The fact remains that the European Council eschewed from 
integrating sport in the official Treaty framework and that the Declarations are essentially non-
binding instruments.
29
 Consequently, the Commission nowadays still often has to use its 
imagination to find an appropriate legal basis for any given action or measure in the area of sport. 
For example, after the initiative had been taken to conceive 2004 as the European Year of  
Sport,
30
 a link with the Community’s education policy was found, so as to endow the official 
Decision
31
 with an appropriate legal basis.  
Secondly, the absence of a Treaty provision on sport also has financial consequences. The 
Court of Justice has stated that each item in the budget requires a legal basis.
32
 As a result, the 
European Commission was forced to suspend the Eurathlon programme,
33
 through which the 
Union supported several sporting events between 1995 and 1998.
34
 In spite of this, the 
Community nevertheless manages to be actively involved in the financing of various sports 
related activities.
35
 The sums invested are, however, relatively modest. In 2003, the European 
Year of People with Disabilities, for example, EUR 6 million were donated for the organisation 
                                                          
27
 See above, n. 1-2.  
28
 Case T-313/02 Meca-Medina & Majcen v Commission, judgment of 30 September 2004, nyr., para. 38; Case C-
176/96 Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine v FRBSB [2000] ECR I-2681, para. 33; Joined Cases C-
51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège v Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines ASBL and others [2000] ECR I-2549, para. 
42. 
29
 Weatherill defines the negotiations at the Amsterdam and Nice IGC as marked by ‘the refusal to exempt sport, but 
the temptation to garland it with laurel’: Weatherill, ‘”Fair Play Please”’, Recent Developments in the Application of 
EC Law to Sport’ (2003) 40 CMLRev., p. 89. 
30
 Already in 1997 the European Parliament called for the organisation of a ‘European Year of Sport’. A-4-0197/97, 
‘Report on the role of the European Union in the field of sport’, Rapporteur: D. Pack, 28 May 1997; European 
Parliament, Resolution on the role of the European Union in the field of sport, 13 June 1997, [1997] OJ C 200/252. 
31
 Decision 291/2003/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 February 2003 establishing the European 
Year of Education trough Sport 2004, [2003] OJ L 43/1. 
32
 Case C-106/96 UK v Commission of the European Communities [1998] ECR I-2729. Hervey, ‘Case C-106/96 UK 
v Commission of the European Communities’ (1999) 36 CMLRev. 1079. On the ‘abuse of budgetary powers’, 
Dashwood, ‘The Limits of European Community Powers’ (1996) 21 ELRev 126. 
33
 Consult http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l35001.htm. 
34
 Tokarski, Steinbach, Petry and Jesse, above n. 5, p. 64; IP/94/980, ‘Eurathlon’, Brussels, 25 October 1994. 
35
 Two provisions in the Community budget provided for the funding of sport related projects: European Year of 
Education through Sport; Preparatory measures for a Community policy in the field of sport. The latter is a 
preparatory action within the meaning of Article 49(2) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 
June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities [2002] OJ L 
248. In addition, ‘sport projects’ can be funded indirectly under programmes relating to Community policies such as 
health, youth, education, environment, research, regional policy.  
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of the Dublin Special Olympics.
36
 And during the 2004 European Year of Education through 
Sport, a total sum of EUR 6,5 million was divided amongst 200 sports projects, ranging from the 
creation of a European Academy for Sport Leaders over the organisation of a Coaches-on-Tour 
event to projects aimed at enhancing the participation in leisure sports programmes for children 
and young people.
37
 Also a number of sports related studies
38
 and campaigns
39
 have been funded 
with Community budgets.  
 
In view of all this, it is unsurprising that the Community’s direct sports policy appears rather 
moderate, inconsistent, unstructured and lacking in effectiveness. The struggle to develop an anti-
doping policy at Community level perfectly illustrates this point. After the infamous events in the 
1998 Tour de France, in which a large quantity of prohibited substances was intercepted by the 
police in a bus belonging to the Festina team, the Vienna European Council, the European 
Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and the Member States’ ministers of sport urged the 
Commission to issue proposals for a more harmonised public health policy with a view to 
combating doping.
40
 The Commission responded with an ambitious support plan, identifying 
three main challenges in the fight against doping: (1) to assemble experts’ opinions on the ethical, 
legal and scientific dimensions of doping; (2) to contribute to preparing the creation of a World 
Anti-Doping Agency; and (3) to mobilise relevant Community competences and instruments.
41
 
However, it has proved hard to concretise these ambitions. The Commission was effectively 
involved in the creation of WADA in 1999 and did act (together with a representative from the 
EU Presidency) for two years as EU representative in the WADA Foundation Board.
42
 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that the Board was ‘not prepared to take decisions which are 
                                                          
36
 IP/03/855, ‘Special Olympics for people with learning disabilities open in Dublin with the support of the European 
Union’, Brussels, 18 June 2003. 
37
 IP/04/1433, ‘European Year of Education through Sport: mutual learning and exchange of best practice to the fore 
as the Year draws to a close’, Brussels, 2 December 2004. 
38
 E.g. at the end of 2004, four sport related studies were finalised with support from the European Community  
(http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/sport). 
39
 E.g. the joint anti-smoking campaign with UEFA, see IP/04/735, ‘EURO 2004 feels free to say no to smoking’, 
Brussels, 11 June 2004.  
40
 Presidency Conclusions, Vienna European Council, (11 & 12 December 1998), Bulletin EU 12-1998; European 
Parliament, Resolution on urgent measures to be taken against doping in sport, 9 April 1999, [1999] OJ C 98/291; 
Committee of the Regions, Opinion on ‘the European Model of Sport’, 16 September 1999, [1999] OJ C 374/56.  
41
 COM (1999) 643 Final: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Community support plan to combat doping in 
sport’, Brussels, 1 December 1999. 
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necessary to reconcile the WADA budgetary rules with Community financial rules’, the 
Commission refused to present a proposal for a structural funding of the Agency.
43
 Accordingly, 
Commissioner Reding withdrew from the Board and the Member States had to look for 
alternatives to arrange the ‘European’ contribution to WADA.
44
 Moreover, the rivalry between 
three EU cities (Bonn, Stockholm and Vienna) to obtain the seat of the WADA headquarters 
illustrates the lack of solidarity and unity among the Member States in this field. Ultimately, 
Europe, that traditionally played a flagship role in the battle against doping,
45
 lost the 
headquarters to Montreal. Despite the high sounding words in the aftermath of the Festina Tour, 
it must thus be acknowledged that the role of the Community is currently merely limited to ad-
hoc co-operation with WADA, along with funding research projects and campaigns to raise 
public awareness,
46
 whereas the hard-core decisions and the implementation of a world-wide 
anti-doping policy are left to other levels, like WADA, the Council of Europe, UNESCO
47
 and 
the individual Member States.
48
 
 
All in all, the conclusion seems to be that, despite the meritorious efforts to develop and 
streamline a direct sports policy, the 2004 EYES programme being a respectable attempt to this 
effect, these are almost bound to remain merely modest or marginal, until official legitimacy is 
given in the Treaty to pursue further action in the domain of sport.
49
 
 
Indirect Sports Approach 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
42
 WADA was created on 10 November 1999, with Lausanne as the provisional headquarter. See constitutive 
instrument of foundation, Antoine Rochat, Notary Lausanne, 10 November 1999. 
43
 IP/01/1727, ‘Community funding of the operating budget of the World Anti-Doping Agency has been ruled out’, 
Brussels, 3 December 2001. 
44
 Today, the Member States of the European Union have three representatives in the Board. The Council of Europe 
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Besides a direct sports policy, the Community institutions have also developed an indirect 
approach to sport, when assessing the compatibility of sporting rules with the Treaty provisions 
on freedom of movement or competition law. Practice has shown that the European Court of 
Justice, when the opportunity presents itself, invariably opts for settling a dispute on the basis of 
Articles 39 or 49 EC, and subsequently does not pronounce itself any longer on the lawfulness of 
the contested rule under Articles 81-82 EC. In fairness, so far only the European Commission and 
the Court of First Instance have dealt with a number of cases on grounds of competition law in 
sports related matters. In what follows, both strands of the Community’s indirect sports approach 
shall be illustrated and analysed on the basis of a number of relevant cases. 
 
Sport & freedom of movement 
 
Many problems have already arisen between sportsmen and their clubs or federations about 
the mobility of athletes in the EU.
50
 In the first place, the Court of Justice has had to deal with 
sporting rules imposing nationality requirements. In the regulations of the sporting associations, 
nationality clauses usually take two different forms: either they exclude athletes from playing for 
a certain team or from taking part in a sporting competition on grounds of their (foreign) 
nationality; or they consist of quantitative restrictions for clubs to contractually engage and/or 
field players of a foreign nationality in official contests.  
 
The Court of Justice has consistently refused to interfere with instances of nationality 
discrimination concerning matches between national teams. According to an established line of 
case law, the free movement provisions ‘do not prevent the adoption of rules or of a practice 
excluding foreign players from participation in certain matches for reasons which are not of an 
economic nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus of 
sporting interest only.’
51
 This hands-off approach of the Court in relation to national teams has 
not met with substantive criticism. In his opinion on Bosman, AG Lenz stated that it appears 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
49
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‘obvious and convincing’.
52
 That may very well be, but it must be acknowledged that in 
contemporary society, the Court’s explanation for this ‘restriction on the scope of Community 
law’ does no longer reflect reality. In general, matches between national teams are no longer of 
‘purely sporting interest’. The Court’s position appears thus to be too generous towards the 
sporting world. It is submitted that an elegant solution to rectify this would be to adhere in this 
respect to the position adopted already in Deliège.
53
 In that case the contested selection rules 
inevitably had the effect of limiting the number of participants in a tournament, but such a 
limitation was regarded as being ‘inherent in the conduct of an international high-level sports 
event, which necessarily involves certain selection rules or criteria being adopted.’
54
 Such rules 
could not in themselves be regarded as constituting a restriction on the principle of freedom of 
movement. The Court also held that the adoption of one system for selecting participants rather 
than another must be based ‘on a large number of considerations unconnected with the personal 
situation of any athlete, such as the nature, the organization and the financing of the sport 
concerned.’
55
 By analogy, it could be stipulated that a rule requiring athletes to have the 
nationality of the country of which they represent the national team in international sporting 
events does not in itself, as long as it derives from a need inherent in the organisation of such a 
competition, constitute a restriction on the Treaty free movement provisions.
56
 This solution 
appears to be entirely satisfactory: on the one hand, it reflects the assumption that in encounters 
between national teams, matters such as national pride and identity still play a decisive role and, 
in principle, outweigh the economic and financial interests at stake. As a result, these matches, in 
principle, deserve shelter from the application of Community law. On the other hand, it does not 
turn a blind eye to the reality that matches between national teams often have become huge 
commercial events. Therefore, when the restrictive effect of these particular nationality clauses 
goes beyond what is necessary and inherent to organise matches between national teams, Articles 
39 and 49 EC will come into play. This conclusion fits squarely into the Court’s principled 
statement that the ‘restriction on the scope of the provisions in question must remain limited to its 
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proper objective and cannot be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity’ from the 
scope of the Treaty.
57
  
The legal situation of naturalised athletes and sportsmen with a dual nationality could 
serve as a test-case for the proposed solution. Nowadays, several athletes are prepared to do just 
about everything to be able to compete in international competitions. Nationality changes are 
becoming increasingly frequent.
58
 Federations do not adopt a uniform position in this respect. 
Some allow an athlete to compete for a country when he has acquired the nationality of this 
country, regardless of whether he has already competed for another country,
59
 whereas others 
prohibit a sportsman to wear the shirt of two different countries during his career.
60
 There are also 
federations which make the permission to compete for another country conditional upon 
fulfilment of a number of conditions, such as a waiting period.
61
 It would be interesting to verify 
to what extent rules hindering naturalised athletes or sportsmen with a dual nationality to play for 
a given national team can be framed as inherent in the organisation of a sporting competition, and 
when they must be viewed as going beyond what is inherently necessary, and thus inevitably 
come under Community scrutiny.   
 
Conversely, the Court of Justice has firmly brandished all discriminatory measures at club 
level as incompatible with Community law. Already in Donà, the Court held that a rule allowing 
only nationals to take part in matches organised by the responsible national federation, was 
contrary to Articles 12, 39 and 49 EC.
62
 The Court’s subsequent dismissal of the nationality 
clauses in Bosman appears to leave no longer room for sporting federations to treat domestic 
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players more favourable than foreign players with the nationality of a country belonging to the 
EU or the European Economic Area (EEA).
63
 The Court categorically held that the arguments 
relating to the maintenance of a traditional link between a club and its country, the creation of a 
sufficient pool of players for the national team and the preservation of a competitive balance 
between clubs were not such as to preserve the nationality clauses under the objective 
justification doctrine.
64
 In the light of the discriminatory nature of these nationality clauses, this 
strict approach is rather unobjectionable.  
However, the Court’s ruling in Bosman did not signal the end of nationality clauses at 
club level. Many associations held on to quota with regard to third-country nationals. In 2003, the 
Court was invited to express its opinion on the legality of such nationality requirements. The case 
of Kolpak involved a professional handball goalkeeper of Slovak nationality who played in the 
German second division and who challenged the rule of the German handball federation, 
stipulating that clubs were entitled to field only two non-EU/EEA nationals in official matches.
65
 
The Court concluded that Kolpak, who was legally employed in Germany, could legitimately 
invoke Article 38(1) of the Association Agreement concluded between the European 
Communities and Slovakia, which confers the right to equal treatment to Slovak nationals as 
regards working conditions, remuneration and dismissal in the EU in relation to the host Member 
State’s nationals.
66
 Again, the Court showed no inclination to accept the arguments to justify the 
contested rule, which were grossly the same as in Bosman.
67
 The potential impact of this decision 
is far-reaching: the European Communities have concluded international agreements containing a 
similar equal treatment clause with a large number of third-countries, and arguably, a lot of them 
seem to fulfil the criteria for direct effect.
68
 Admittedly, the dispute in Kolpak concerned a 
national from a country which was, at the time of the proceedings, at the verge of becoming an 
EU Member State. The impression could therefore not entirely be discarded that the final 
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outcome, in particular the Court’s stance on the justification issue, might have been different had 
the case involved a sportsman from a non-accession country.  
After Kolpak, the situation was thus not completely clarified yet. An excellent occasion to 
settle the issue was not long in coming. In the case of Simutenkov, a Russian footballer playing 
for Tenerife complained about the fact that the Spanish football federation had issued a licence as 
a non-Community player, subjecting him to the quota for non-EU/EEA nationals.
69
 In its 
judgment, the Court followed exactly the same line of reasoning as in Kolpak, enabling 
Simutenkov to base his claim for a Community licence directly on Article 23(1) of the 
Partnership Agreement concluded between the European Communities and Russia. The Court 
refrained from entering into an in-depth analysis of the justification issue, seemingly conveying 
the message that the hard line it had previously adopted with regard to nationality discrimination 
of EU/EEA nationals is to be extended to privileged third-country nationals. For these non-
EU/EEA sportsmen to be able to challenge nationality clauses, it suffices that they are legally 
employed in a host EU Member State and can rely upon a directly effective equal treatment 
provision included in an international agreement establishing a partnership between the European 
Communities and their country of origin, regardless of whether accession to the EU is envisaged 
or not.
70
 Strictly legally speaking, the lifeline of nationality clauses at club level in sport appears 
now thinner than ever.  
In this particular context, one final observation is on its place: the last decade, 
enlargement and integration-prone developments have been the magic formula of the EU, the 
driving forces behind many a European policy. Now that the ratification process of the 
Constitutional Treaty turns out to be much more troublesome than expected, it cannot be 
excluded that this somehow might exert an influence on Europe’s indirect sports approach in the 
near future. It is hard to predict with absolute certainty how the Court of Justice will react to the 
current crisis in the EU. Is it fair or even reasonable to state that the outcome of a case such as 
Simutenkov might just have been different had the defendants adduced appropriately chosen and 
carefully worded justification arguments, or simply if the case had been decided a couple of 
months later, in a changed political climate? In view of the central position the prohibition of 
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discrimination on grounds of nationality occupies in the Treaty framework, a radical reversal of 
the Court’s approach with regard to nationality requirements seems unlikely. In any event, it is 
clear that, despite several unequivocal condemnations, many sporting federations still have not 
abandoned the idea of nationality clauses. Recently, UEFA adopted a new home-grown rule, 
providing that each club must have a certain number of domestically trained players under 
contract. According to the new ‘4+4’ rule, by the start of the 2008/09 season, four players out of a 
squad of maximum 25 must have received their training at the club itself, while another four must 
be developed by other clubs from the same country.
71
 It is advocated that UEFA’s home-grown 
rule, which appears to be favouring local players and therefore inevitably runs the risk of being 
qualified as indirectly discriminatory, could provide the Court of Justice with another excellent 
opportunity to clarify the position of the EU on nationality clauses.  
 
Conceptually, the Court of Justice has consistently adopted the same rigorous approach in 
all cases concerning the mobility of sportsmen within the EU, involving nationality clauses, 
transfer payments, selection procedures, transfer periods or the likes of it. The Court’s search for 
a solution within the Community framework, which takes into account the claims of the sporting 
authorities and at the same time complies with the exigencies of Community law, is effectuated 
on a case-by-case basis, and is thus influenced by the circumstances of each case. The Court’s 
record for its dealings with sports related cases is unquestionably rather good.
72
 In sporting 
circles, the Court is often criticised for over-accentuating the importance of the migration rights 
of the individual athletes in this respect. It is alleged that on this ground, the Court has effectuated 
or allowed too many and too intrusive judicial inroads on the self-proclaimed spheres of 
autonomous competence of the sporting bodies, thereby infringing their freedom of association 
and failing to take sufficient account of the specific needs of sport. Arguably, this submission is 
unfounded. The Court has never interfered with sporting rules sensu strictu, the ‘rules of the 
game’, such as, the length of matches or the height of the net. On the contrary, it is advocated that 
the Community institutions have at times probably shown too much respect for the autonomy of 
the sporting authorities and have overrated the special status of sport, both from a factual and 
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from a legal point of view. Sport does indeed possess certain special features, such as the mutual 
interdependence of sports teams, and at times, the special treatment accorded to sport under 
Community law appears therefore to be legitimate, whether it is to maintain a certain sporting 
and financial balance between sport clubs, to ensure the homogeneity and the regularity of 
competitions or to preserve the essential element of unpredictability of outcome. However, this 
should not go to the detriment of the rights of the sportsmen, or at least have only a minimal and 
proportionate impact.
73
 Presumably, at the moment the perfect balance between all interests at 
stake has not been found yet. It can, in particular, rightly be questioned whether the training and 
development of young players really constitutes a legitimate aim which is sufficiently specific to 
the sports sector so as to justify restrictions to the freedom of movement of athletes?
74
 This seems 
by no means evident.
75
  
 
Sport & competition law 
 
Under the heading of the competition rules, the Community institutions, in the first place 
the European Commission, have proceeded largely along the same track in their dealings with 
sporting affairs. Some years ago, the Commission already revealed its intention to group the 
practices of sporting associations in four categories: 1) rules to which, in principle, Article 81(1) 
EC does not apply, given that such rules are inherent to sport and/or necessary for its 
organisation; (2) rules which are, in principle, prohibited if they have a significant effect on trade 
between Member States; (3) rules which are restrictive of competition but which in principle 
qualify for an exemption; and (4) rules which are abusive of a dominant position under Article 82 
EC.
76
 The Community’s practices can be illustrated on the basis of a number of concrete 
examples.  
 
In February 2000, ENIC lodged a complaint against UEFA as regards its rule on ‘Integrity 
of the UEFA Club competitions: Independence of clubs’. According to the UEFA rule, when two 
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or more clubs which are under common control qualify for participation in the same UEFA club 
competition, only one is eligible to effectively take part. At the time of the proceedings, ENIC 
owned stakes in five clubs in five different countries. It claimed that it had been directly and 
materially affected by the operation of the rule and that it was likely to continue to suffer 
irreparable damage in the future, and challenged the compatibility of the UEFA rule with Articles 
81-82 EC. The Commission rejected the complaint, asserting that the contested rule cannot be 
qualified as a restriction and therefore falls outside the scope of Article 81(1) EC.
77
 In the opinion 
of the Commission, the possible effect of the UEFA rule on the freedom of action of clubs and 
investors is ‘inherent to the very existence of credible UEFA competitions’.
78
 In any event, it 
decided that ‘it does not lead to a limitation on the freedom of action of clubs and investors that 
goes beyond what is necessary to ensure its legitimate aim of protecting the uncertainty of results 
and giving the public the right perception as to the integrity of the UEFA competitions with a 
view to ensure their proper functioning’.
79
 Arguably, this decision is correct.  
 
In July 2003, the Commission adopted a formal decision exempting the collective selling 
of the media rights of the UEFA Champions League.
80
 Initially, it earmarked the joint selling of 
the television, internet and mobile telephone rights of an international sporting competition such 
as the Champions League as restrictive of competition, for it limits price competition and reduces 
output. However, after UEFA had undertaken to change its regulations, it held that an appropriate 
joint selling arrangement could benefit from an exemption under Article 81(3) EC, putting 
reliance also on the financial solidarity between clubs. The new arrangement contains a 
segmentation of the media rights in 14 different rights packages, which are to be sold separately 
on the basis of a public bidding procedure, and which concern not only TV rights, but also all 
other media rights, such as radio or internet. Having regard to several decisions of national courts 
and competition authorities in similar cases,
81
 it appears that this decision might also have gone 
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the other way, forcing the conclusion that the UEFA cannot complain about its treatment under 
EC competition law.  
 
On 30 September 2004, the Court of First Instance rendered its judgment in the case of 
Meca-Medina & Majcen.
82
 Surprisingly, this is only the first real ruling of a Luxembourg court 
on the applicability of Community competition law to sports rules. Meca-Medina and Majcen are 
professional sportsmen competing in long-distance swimming. In an anti-doping test carried out 
during a World Cup event in Brazil, they tested positive for nandrolone. Initially, the Doping 
Panel of FINA, the International swimming federation, suspended both athletes for a period of 
four years, a suspension which was first confirmed, but later reduced to two years by the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport, after certain scientific experiments had showed that nandrolone’s 
metabolites could be produced endogenously by the human body at a level which can exceed the 
accepted limit. Hereupon, Meca-Medina and Majcen filed a complaint with the Commission, 
alleging a breach of Articles 81-82 EC of certain regulations adopted by the International 
Olympic Committee and implemented by FINA, as well as certain practices relating to doping 
control. After the Commission had rejected their complaint,
83
 they brought an action before the 
Court of First Instance, seeking annulment of the Commission’s decision. The Court of First 
Instance acknowledged that high-level sport has largely become an economic activity, but 
pointed out that the campaign against doping does not pursue any economic objective.
84
 It stated 
that it is intended to preserve the spirit of fair play and to safeguard the health of athletes. In the 
opinion of the Court of First Instance, without fair play, ‘sport, be it amateur or professional, is 
no longer sport. That purely social objective is sufficient to justify the campaign against doping.’ 
The prohibition of doping must be regarded as a ‘particular expression of the requirement of fair 
play’, and constitutes a ‘cardinal rule of sport’.
85
 Moreover, the Court of First Instance stipulated 
that ‘sport is essentially a gratuitous and not an economic act, even when the athlete performs it 
in the course of professional sport. […] The prohibition of doping and the anti-doping legislation 
concern exclusively, even when the sporting action is performed by a professional, a non-
economic aspect of that sporting action, which constitutes its very essence’.
86
 On these grounds, 
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the Court of First Instance finally dismissed the action, concluding that ‘the prohibition of doping 
is based on purely sporting considerations and therefore has nothing to do with any economic 
consideration.’
87
 Consequently, the rules to combat doping do not fall under the scope of Articles 
49 EC, 81 EC and 82 EC. The anti-doping rules are conceived to be intimately linked to sport as 
such.
88
 While the final outcome of this case may be acceptable, the reasoning of the Court of First 
Instance definitely is not. Arguably, by qualifying anti-doping rules as rules of ‘purely sporting 
interest’ which therefore fall outside the scope of Community law, the Court of First Instance has 
granted too much room for manoeuvre to the sporting associations. A much better solution, as 
also Weatherill advocates,
89
 would have consisted of examining the contested rules on the basis 
of an analysis founded on Wouters.
90
 Concretely, this would boil down to an investigation of 
whether the anti-doping rules at issue are intimately linked to the proper conduct of sporting 
competition, whether they are necessary to combat doping effectively and whether the limitation 
of athletes’ freedom of action does not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective. In its 
decision, the Commission carried out precisely this analysis and reached the conclusion that the 
contest anti-doping rules did not fall foul of the prohibition under Article 81 EC.
91
 The Court of 
First Instance subsequently departed from it. Yet, the case is currently on appeal to the Court of 
Justice.
92
 Hopefully, the Court will adopt a more sound reasoning to come to its judgment.  
 
On 26 January 2005, the Court of First Instance already rendered a second decision 
concerning sport and competition law. It dismissed the application of Laurent Piau for annulment 
of the Commission’s decision rejecting his complaint concerning the validity of the FIFA 
Players’ Agents Regulations under Articles 81-82 EC, on grounds that the Commission did not 
commit a manifest error of assessment.
93
 Again, the Court’s reasoning leading up to the final 
decision does not appear to be entirely satisfactory.
94
  Arguably, the significance of the ruling lies 
primarily in a number of principled statements the Court of First Instance made with regard to the 
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role and powers of the sporting associations. It signalled that FIFA adopted the contested 
regulations of its own authority and not ‘on the basis of rule-making powers conferred on it by 
public authorities in connection with a recognised task in the general interest concerning sporting 
activity.’
95
 Moreover, it held that those regulations do not fall within the scope of the freedom of 
internal organisation enjoyed by sports associations either. Therefore the Court of First Instance 
ruled that the legitimacy of a private organisation like FIFA to enact rules ‘which do not have a 
sport-related object, but regulate an economic activity that is peripheral to the sporting activity in 
question and touch on fundamental freedoms’ is questionable and that such rules cannot be 
automatically regarded as compatible with Community law, in particular with regard to respect 
for civil and economic liberties.
96
 Concretely, the Court stipulated that the Players’ Agents 
Regulations are a reflection of FIFA’s resolve to coordinate the conduct of its members with 
regard to the activity of players’ agents and constitute a decision by an association of 
undertakings within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC.
97
  It also decided that FIFA holds a 
collective dominant position on the market for players’ agents’ services.
98
 
These pronouncements of the Court of First Instance may not have been relevant for the 
outcome of this particular case, it is nevertheless immediately apparent that they are likely to 
greatly influence the future case law of the Luxembourg courts in sports-related issues. The Court 
has clearly hinted at its willingness to review the practical monopoly power of the sports 
federations in organisational and regulatory matters under the competition law provisions. 
Litigation is already under way. In Belgium, Charleroi has instituted legal proceedings against 
FIFA. According to FIFA regulations, football clubs must release their players for international 
representative matches.
99
 In 2004, one of Charleroi’s most influential players, Oulmers, returned 
injured from international duty with Morocco and remained sidelined for more than six months. 
Charleroi was not entitled to compensation. It regards this mandatory players release system as an 
abuse of  FIFA’s dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC. The hearings in this 
case are eagerly awaited. Ultimately, if the parties fail to reach a settlement, the Court of Justice 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
rejected’, 3 February 2005, (consult http://www.euractiv.com); Vermeersch, ‘Piau t. Commissie: Sportieve 
competitie eindigt op 0-1’ (2005) 11 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 101. 
95
 Piau, above n. 93, para. 74 
96
 Piau, above n. 93, para. 77. 
97
 Piau, above n. 93, para. 75. 
98
 Piau, above n. 93, para. 114. 
99
 Annex 1 Release of players for Association teams, FIFA 2005 Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players.   
 25 
could be forced to adjudicate whether these rules fall under the organisational and regulatory 
autonomy of the sporting bodies or rather go beyond it.
100
         
In the same vein, the debate about the current transfer rules in football could – again - be 
reopened. In December 1998, the European Commission sent a statement of objections to FIFA, 
announcing that it viewed certain provisions of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer 
of Players which were applicable at the time as incompatible with Article 81 EC. In March 2003, 
the Commission was found willing to terminate the infringement procedure, after FIFA had 
undertaken to change its existing regulations. However, it is open to question whether the current 
FIFA Regulations, in particular the chapters on maintenance of contractual stability and training 
compensation, are fully in line with the requirements of Community law. Only in December 
2005, the Court of Arbitration for Sport had to decide the dispute between AS Roma and Auxerre 
relating to the unilateral breach of contract by Philippe Mexès.
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 If a case involving transfers 
were to reach the stage of the Courts in Luxembourg again, some aspects of the current FIFA 
transfer system may not withstand the test of compatibility with EC competition law.
102
  
 
From the practice of the Community institutions under the competition law provisions in 
relation to sport, even though it is not all that extensive yet, by and large the same picture 
emerges as from the Court’s jurisprudence relating to freedom of movement. Sport has been 
firmly subjected to Community competition law and has not been granted an outright exemption 
from its scope. Also in this context, the particular features of sport have been regarded rather 
generously. In view of the statements of the Court of First Instance in Piau, interesting new 
developments are furthermore to be expected.    
 
 
Conclusion  
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 See also Weatherill, ‘Is the pyramid compatible with EC law?’, (2005) 3-4 International Sports Law Journal 3. 
101
 CAS 2005/A/902 & 903 Mexès and AS Roma v AJ Auxerre. 
102
 For instance, it does not seem inconceivable that a rule imposing a sports sanction on a club which is considered 
to have induced a player to unilaterally breach his contract with another club, consisting of a prohibition to acquire 
new players during a certain period, might be qualified as unjustifiably restricting competition between clubs. If the 
period is too long, especially the principle of proportionality might not be respected. See Van den Bogaert, above n. 
50, pp. 213-320. 
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In general, the relation between the European institutions and the sporting world can best 
be qualified as uncomfortable. The introduction of sport in the European Constitution might add 
an interesting new dimension to the ‘sport and European law’ saga. At first sight, there is not 
much spectacular about Articles I-17 and III-282. In the near future no major changes would have 
to be expected in the EU approach to sport. The application of the free movement provisions and 
the competition law rules to sports rules and practices would in all likelihood simply proceed, 
paying due regard to the specific characteristics of sport. The importance of this Treaty reference 
to sport would be largely symbolical, legitimising Community action already taken in the field of 
sport. Be that as it may, attention should be paid not to overlook its intrinsic strengths: the official 
recognition of sports as a Union policy could be instructive to the European institutions to find a 
more appropriate balance between the wishes of the sporting world and the exigencies of 
European law. Moreover, it would neatly delineate the room for manoeuvring of the European 
institutions in the field of sport, establishing that they can only carry out supporting, co-
ordinating or complementary action, thereby thus implicitly respecting and confirming the 
primary role of the sporting associations. All in all, therefore, the inclusion of sport in the Treaty 
must be welcomed, although the exclusion of any harmonising measures can be deplored.  
In the event that it were to turn out impossible or unworkable to implement the European 
Constitution and this were to mean the demise of sport in the Treaty, the consequences for the 
European sports policy would not be too far-reaching. It would be especially hard to intensify and 
streamline the European direct sports policy, but this was bound to remain limited in scope after 
all. Nevertheless, the Treaty provisions concerning sport do seem to create the opportunity for the 
European institutions and the sporting federations to be no longer uneasy bedfellows. It would be 
a pity not to seize the occasion.  
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